
In 2006, the Parliament of Montenegro declared independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. After that, in 2008, Montenegro started the process of applying for membership in the European Union (EU). This endeavor gained momentum in 2010 when the Commission gave a positive opinion on Montenegro’s application, outlining a set of critical priorities that need to be addressed in order for negotiations to begin. At the same time, the Council granted Montenegro candidate status. In December 2011, the Council inaugurated the accession process, with the aim of starting negotiations by June 2012. Official negotiations with Montenegro began on June 29, 2012. Taking into account the chronology of these events and the prolonged pace of the accession process, together with the consequent impact of geopolitical shifts, it is relevant to discuss Montenegro’s path to EU accession in several stages: by 2020, and beyond, with 2020 serving as a significant turning point on this path.
Montenegro’s EU accession path up to 2020
During the period following eight years of accession negotiations culminating in 2020, all 33 meticulously reviewed Chapters were successfully initiated, with three provisionally concluded. Montenegro emerged as the foremost achiever in this complex negotiation process, establishing itself as a leading advocate for EU integration in the Balkans. This perception was reinforced by consistently high public approval rates, which seldom dipped below 60% and often ranged between 70-80%, reflecting strong support for the outlined foreign policy objectives. However, in the autumn of 2020, Montenegro experienced a pivotal shift with the ousting of the ruling structures of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its coalition partners after three decades of governance. These parties were pivotal in advocating Montenegro’s accession to both NATO (achieved in 2017) and the European Union. The envisioned goal of EU membership, which once seemed attainable, gradually receded into the realm of uncertainty. The prolonged nature of the accession process can be attributed to various overlapping factors, notably political patronage superseding meritocracy, pervasive corruption within influential political circles, and a judiciary and prosecution system susceptible to political influence. Additionally, deficiencies in upholding the rule of law and other following substrates of infamous Chapters 23 and 24, were consistently identified as major impediments to democratic consolidation. The fact that in the neighborhood there is Croatia as an example, which after “only” 10 years of negotiations, finally successfully joined the Union in 2013 – did not help either. Due to the facts that Montenegro is not a big country and the inherent potential that small structures do possess in terms of swifter adaptability to transitional changes – the entire process takes on features of much slower joining pace than what all interested and involved parties had hoped for. Analysts noted that Montenegro’s political landscape, primarily shaped by the legacy of communist bureaucracy and abrupt subsequent adoption of neoliberal economic principles, created a hybrid system ill-prepared for sudden shifts in governance, exemplified by the events of 2020, when Montenegro was poised as a viable candidate for EU membership.
Montenegro’s EU accession path beyond 2020
Over the span of three years, there were two subsequent changes in government, marking a significant shift in governance paradigms and the entire political infrastructure of these regimes. These transitions occurred amidst the backdrop of persistent economic challenges and the ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic, with Montenegro experiencing one of the world’s highest mortality rates due to the pandemic’s impact on its ineffective and unprepared healthcare system. Within this volatile environment, the realignment of priorities became pivotal, overshadowing the focus on Montenegro’s accession to the European Union, which became somewhat obscured amid the tumultuous changes in government. Consequently, poor commitment to advancing negotiations and accepting democratic principles weakened Montenegro’s former prominent position as a leader for EU membership, which then was replaced by a consequent deterioration of the ratings, as often underscored by both Brussels spokespeople and the Commission’s progress reports. Furthermore, the implementation of the revised enlargement methodology, coupled with the reorganization that merged Serbia and Montenegro under a unified unit within DG NEAR, has inadvertently hindered Montenegro’s negotiating stance. This restructuring undermines the established momentum of Montenegro’s progress, transitioning from its previous incremental advancement through the “regatta system” to a more passive group negotiation dynamic alongside Serbia which obviously no longer prioritizes EU accession. Compounded by the lack of tangible progress in negotiation processes by the successive governments since 2020, Montenegro finds itself in a state of stagnation, if not regression, concerning the advancement of democratic reforms.
The wavering approach of EU enlargement initiative and its future
The EU’s haphazard commitment to enlargement, coupled with its rigorous conditionality that nevertheless has transformative limits and often bends to the vagaries of domestic politics in the member states, can lead to growing frustration with the integration process. As such, both political structures and citizens, begin to adjust their EU accession ambitions to more pragmatic and achievable goals. In the context of European Union (EU) aspirations, the Union’s relationship with the countries of the Eastern Partnership closely mirrors its current dynamics with the Western Balkans. Initially, a significant interdependency existed between the EU’s enlargement policies and the Eastern Partnership objectives. However, over time, these policies have gradually diverged. Certain EU member states, notably France, have exhibited reluctance towards endorsing EU membership for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia since the inception of the Eastern Partnership. This reluctance stems from a desire to maintain the integrity of the integration process and avoid antagonizing Russia. Consequently, the EU has predominantly espoused the rhetoric of “European aspirations” for these countries rather than committing to full membership. This cautious approach, influenced by historical precedents, inadvertently created opportunities for Russia to exert influence and exacerbate tensions, particularly evident in the conflict in Ukraine. This conflict served as a pivotal moment prompting the EU to reassess its enlargement policy, recognizing the imperative of swift action in response to escalating regional conflicts. In March 2022, driven by concerns over territorial disputes and a desire for the security afforded by EU membership, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia applied for EU accession. Subsequently, in June, EU leaders, guided by a comprehensive European Commission assessment, granted candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine while deferring a decision on Georgia pending further political reforms. Notably, the Commission recommended Georgia for candidate status contingent upon fulfilling agreed-upon criteria. Analysts widely concur that the Ukrainian conflict expedited the candidacy status and negotiation processes for these countries, a development previously unimaginable prior to Russia’s aggressive actions. This geopolitical shift underscored the necessity for the EU to fortify its eastern front in the face of Russian aggression, a fine historical lesson to keep in mind in regards to Balkans’ accession dynamics and its implications, as well.
2024: a year of great challenges for democracy and possible revisions of many global processes
The upcoming year of 2024 is poised to mark an unprecedented milestone in global electoral activity. With over 60 nations, collectively representing half of the world’s population— approximately 4 billion individuals—scheduled to participate in various presidential, legislative, and local elections, the scale and significance of this electoral cycle are unparalleled. Additionally, the European Parliament elections slated for early June hold paramount importance within the context of our discussion. European Union’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has issued cautionary remarks regarding the potential ramifications of these elections, likening their significance to that of the United States presidential race. Borrell’s concern stems from the possibility that voter apprehension towards uncertainty may incline them towards supporting rightwing populist parties. This sentiment is substantiated by scientific studies indicating that fear of the unknown triggers a primal response for security, potentially influencing electoral outcomes. Borrell’s apprehensions are echoed by prevailing electoral forecasts, which suggest a notable surge in support for far-right factions, indicative of a broader trend of mainstream party decline and the rise of extremist ideologies across Europe. Consequently, there is a foreseeable reconfiguration of the European Parliament’s political landscape, characterized by a diminishing influence of established factions such as the European People’s Party and the Socialists and Democrats. This trend underscores the fracturing of European party systems, both domestically and at the continental level, with implications for post-election coalition dynamics. The composition of these coalitions will play a pivotal role in determining the trajectory of the European Union, influencing its commitment to objectives of enlargement, stability, and cohesion. Should right-wing forces garner substantial support in national elections and populist movements secure increased representation in the European Parliament, there looms a possibility of policy stasis or regression in the Union’s engagement with aspiring member states. Thus, the forthcoming electoral outcomes hold profound implications for the future direction of European integration, with potential repercussions for the broader geopolitical landscape.
Summary of the analysis in the context of Montenegro and the continuation of its negotiation process
Montenegro is currently in the twelfth year of negotiations for accession to the European Union, a duration exceeding initial expectations given its relatively modest size and favorable predispositions for implementing necessary democratic reforms. Nevertheless, persistent challenges such as unresolved political issues, an unwieldy and outdated bureaucratic apparatus, and disruptions stemming from economic and pandemic crises have significantly impeded the pace of progress. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić, the new government has made strides in key areas critical to advancing the negotiation process. Positive signals from prominent European leaders during official visits to Brussels indicate a willingness within EU structures to expedite Montenegro’s membership. However, it is evident that the country still has considerable ground to cover in terms of enhancing its democratic capabilities for full integration. Moreover, the imminent year of 2024, hailed as one of the most consequential in electoral history, encapsulates a profound level of uncertainty concerning the trajectory of initiated EU policies. This uncertainty revolves around potential ideological shifts towards right-wing political paradigms in the near future and the ensuing ramifications on ongoing processes. It also raises questions about the continuity of the prevailing trajectory, which prioritizes openness, liberalization, and the envisioned expansion of the European community.
© Dusan Pejakovic,
PhD Candidate, Faculty of Political Science, University of Montenegro
